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Abstract 
When two actors have exactly the same mental states but one happens to harm another person 
(unlucky actor) and the other one does not (lucky actor), the latter elicits milder moral judgment 
among bystanders. We hypothesized that the social role from which transgressions are perceived 
would moderate this outcome effect. In three preregistered experiments (N = 950), we randomly 
assigned participants to imagine and respond to moral scenarios as actor (i.e., perpetrator), 
victim, or bystander. Results revealed highly similar outcome effects on moral judgment across 
social roles. However, as predicted, the social role moderated the strength of the outcome effect 
on interpersonal goals pertaining to agency and communion. Although in agreement about the 
blameworthiness of lucky and unlucky actors, victims’ agency and communion were more 
sensitive to the outcome severity than perpetrators’ agency and communion, with bystanders’ 
outcome sensitivity falling in between. Outcome severity affected agency and communion 
directly instead of being mediated by moral judgment. We discuss the possibility that outcome 
severity raises normative expectations regarding interaction in a transgression’s aftermath that are 
unrelated to moral considerations.  
Keywords: outcome effect, moral judgment, moral luck, social role, needs-based model, 
agency, communion 
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Do You Feel the Same? The Effect of Outcome Severity on Moral Judgment and 
Interpersonal Goals of Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders 
How laypeople make moral judgments is a question that concerns not only moral 
philosophers but also anyone who is familiar with the feeling that they have been wronged. 
Philosophers wonder if their ethical maxims resonate with people’s intuitions. Everyone else also 
hopes that their own moral judgment is shared by other people. After all, it would make for a 
smoother resolution of conflicts if victims and perpetrators could agree on the amount of blame 
an action deserves, and if bystanders were to further validate their judgments. Considering that 
moral judgment seems likely to influence how the parties will interact with each other in the 
aftermath of a transgression, the consensus of moral judgment appears all the more desirable. In 
the present research, we focus on one particular determinant of moral judgment: the severity of a 
transgression’s outcome. Curiously enough, there exists no research that would have compared 
outcome effects across victims, perpetrators and bystanders or examined whether their moral 
judgment are related to the interpersonal goals of these different parties. We present the findings 
of three preregistered studies testing the proposition that victims are the most sensitive to 
outcome information and perpetrators the least. 
Does Outcome Severity Affect Moral Judgment – and Should It? 
 Imagine, as Adam Smith did in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), a man throwing a 
stone over a tall wall onto a public street, killing a person. This man, we would be inclined to 
judge, deserves to be punished. At the same time, Smith observed that nothing “would appear 
more shocking to our natural sense of equity, than to bring a man to the scaffold merely for 
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having thrown a stone carelessly into the street without hurting anybody. The folly and 
inhumanity of his conduct, however, would in this case be the same; but still our sentiments 
would be every different” (p. 152).  
Empirical research shows that the severity of an outcome affects moral judgment. People 
judge an action as less permissible, more wrong, more blameworthy, and call for greater 
punishment when the action leads to greater harm, even if this harm was beyond the agent’s 
control (Cushman, 2008; Cushman, Dreber, Wang, & Costa, 2009; Gino, Moore, & Bazerman, 
2009; Gino, Shu, & Bazerman, 2010; Kneer & Machery, 2019; Lench, Domsky, Smallman, & 
Darbor, 2015; Young, Nichols, & Saxe, 2010; for a review, cf. Martin & Cushman, 2015).  
We can ask whether outcome severity should affect moral judgment. Two positions mark 
the endpoints of a spectrum in normative ethics: The first position is Deontology, according to 
which “nothing in the world […] could be called good without qualification except a good will” 
(Kant, 1785, p.1). According to this view, an action taken for dubious reasons is wrong despite a 
beneficial outcome. The second position is Consequentialism, which regards an action as good to 
the extent that its consequences increase well-being. Thus, regardless of the agent’s intentions, 
radical consequentialists would judge one and the same action as morally better, the better the 
outcome. Both positions, and individuals’ willingness to toggle between them are familiar from 
work on the trolley problem (Foot 1967; Thomson 1976, 1985). Whereas with deontology 
morality depends exclusively on the agent’s intentions (or, broadly conceived, their mental 
states), with consequentialism only the outcomes matter.  
Whereas the outcome effect is consistent with consequentialist ethics, it clashes with a 
fundamental maxim of Kantian ethics, the Control Principle, according to which agents are only 
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responsible for features pertaining to a sequence of action which are under their control. The 
Control Principle suggests that throwing the stone deserves a fixed amount of blame, whether the 
stone happens to fatally hit a person or not. Throwing the stone even deserves blame if it, by 
some unexpected turn of events, produces a beneficial, yet not envisioned, outcome. At the same 
time, many people are inclined towards a marked difference in moral evaluation across the two 
cases discussed by Smith. This intuition, running counter to the Control Principle, generates the 
Puzzle of Moral Luck, which has been at the heart of extensive debate in moral philosophy 
(Nagel, 1979; Williams, 1981; for recent work on Moral Luck, see also Nelkin, 2019; Hartman, 
2017).  
The difference between Kantian and consequentialist ethics is reflected in individual 
differences in outcome sensitivity. In fact, the outcome effect is sometimes exhibited only by a 
small proportion of participants while most people fail to see a moral difference between actions 
ending in good or bad outcomes (e.g., Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Kneer & Machery, 
2019). Such heterogeneity of effects calls for an examination of potential moderator variables. In 
the present research, we focus on the social role of the judge. While previous research has 
exclusively used scenarios in which uninvolved bystanders judge incidents, it is possible that 
judges spontaneously identify with the victim or the perpetrator. Potential moderating effects of 
social role are also practically relevant. From a restorative justice perspective (Wenzel, Okimoto, 
Feather, & Platow, 2008), it is important that perpetrators and victims go beyond retribution and 
engage in interactions that symbolically undo the transgression. Such dialogue and interaction 
between perpetrators and victims would be greatly informed by an understanding of the role-
specific moral judgments. 
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 Since our interests in moral judgment (on which the literature is plentiful) ultimately 
regard interactions in the transgression’s aftermath, we also extend the research on outcome 
effects from moral judgments to moral action. Specifically, we (i) report the first experiments that 
take the social role (perpetrator vs. victim vs. bystander) of the moral assessor into account, and 
(ii) explore how it impacts the assessor’s goals for interacting with the other parties involved. 
In the following, we first review the explanations that the psychological literature offers to 
understand outcome effects among neutral bystanders. Outcome effects across different 
hypothetical social roles are explored with reference to introspection illusion (Pronin, 2009), 
which suggest that victims will be more prone to the outcome effect than perpetrators. Drawing 
on the needs-based model of reconciliation (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), we further hypothesize 
that the difference in judgments across the perpetrator and victim roles extend to their 
interpersonal goals. Human interaction can be parsimoniously described in terms of the broad 
dimensions of agency and communion (Abele & Wojciszke, 2014; Bakan, 1966; Fiske, Cuddy, 
Glick, & Xu, 2002; Locke, 2015; Reeder & Brewer, 1979; Wiggins, 1979, 1991). Agentic goals 
include seeking control, dominance, and power, whereas communal goals include caring for, 
cooperating with, and being connected with others. Given that victims often pursue agentic goals 
and perpetrators often pursue communal goals (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), outcome severity might 
also influence the role-specific goals for agency and communion.  
Finally, a clarification is in order regarding our use of the term “perpetrator” in the context 
of moral luck. Although philosophers or legal experts are likely to disagree as to whether the term 
“perpetrator” is appropriate for an actor who is putting others at risk to be harmed, previous 
research on the social role of perpetrators may inform our understanding of the outcome effect. 
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Laypeople judging such incidents may or may not make the same distinctions as philosophers or 
legal experts. Thus, we will refer to both lucky and unlucky actors as perpetrators in order to be 
able to merge the different literatures.  
Explanations of the Outcome Effect 
The most straightforward model hypothesizes a direct effect of outcome on moral 
judgment (the Simple View). According to a second type of model, different outcome types 
trigger different inferences regarding the epistemic states (knowledge and belief) of the agent, 
which mediate the effect of outcome on moral judgment. Severe outcomes lead the judging 
subject to infer that the agent must have known his action would produce harmful consequence 
(Royzman & Kumar, 2004; Young, Scholz, & Saxe, 2011; for discussion see Nichols, Timmons, 
Lopez, 2014; and Kamtekar & Nichols, 2019). The impact of outcome on moral judgment would 
thus be mediated by epistemic state ascriptions. Another mediation account suggests that severity 
of outcome affects the perceived likelihood of the harmful outcome, which leads to differing 
ascriptions of mens rea (or “inculpating state of mind”) defined in terms of risk such as 
recklessness or negligence, and consequently moral judgment (Kneer & Machery, 2019).   
These hypothesized mechanisms all allow for a rationalist interpretation or else can be 
viewed as a manifestation of biased judgment. One might, for instance, consider a harmful 
outcome that just occurred good evidence for its likelihood. A higher likelihood warrants the 
ascription of negligence (i.e., that the agent should have been aware of a substantial risk, cf. 
Amaya, forthcoming, and Model Penal Code 2.02), and hence – given the presence of a mens rea 
– the ascription of more blame in the bad outcome case than in the neutral one (rationalist 
epistemic state mediation view; Thomson, 1993; Rosebury, 1995; Young et al., 2010; Alfano et 
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al., 2014). Alternatively, one could interpret the different assessments of probability across 
outcomes as an instance of the hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975): ex-post considerations 
inappropriately interfere with evaluations that should be undertaken from an ex-ante perspective. 
The biased assessment of the outcome probability leads to a distorted evaluation of mens rea and 
consequently to an inappropriate moral judgment in the bad outcome case.  (Royzman & Kumar, 
2004; Alicke, 2000; Alicke & Rose, 2010; Nadelhoffer, 2006; Kneer & Machery, 2019).  
Outcome Effects Across Social Roles 
How will social role impact the outcome effect? According to Schein and Gray (2018), 
harm is a matter of perception, and perceived harm can differ from the vantage points of 
perpetrators, victims, and bystanders. For one thing, the orthogonal distinction between first-
person and third-person perspective underpins an asymmetry in epistemic access. In the actor 
perspective, we have direct access to our mental states and motives. In the observer perspective, 
we infer others’ intentions, beliefs and other mental states from behavioral cues. The epistemic 
authority we enjoy from the first-person perspective is frequently deceptive (on misperceptions 
regarding one’s own intentions, cf. Epley & Dunning, 2000; regarding emotions, cf. Gilbert, 
Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998; concerning prescient thoughts, cf. Pronin, Wegner, 
McCarthy, & Rodriguez, 2006). Importantly, however, the asymmetry in epistemic access 
engenders an introspection illusion (Pronin, 2009) with two components: In self-assessment, 
people tend towards disproportionally heavy weighting of introspectively available information 
(i.e. mental state information and personal feelings). In other-assessment, they gravitate towards a 
disproportionally heavy weighting of extrospectively available evidence (i.e. behavioral and 
outcome information; see also Malle, 2005). Notably, this perspective-specific weighting of 
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evidence persists even when actors and observers are equally provided with both introspective 
and extrospective information about behavior (Pronin & Kugler, 2007).  
The introspection illusion suggests the following hypotheses regarding the outcome effect 
across social roles: Unlike perpetrators, who not only observe the outcome but also have access 
to their mental states prior to the outcome, victims and bystanders, in their assessment of the 
actor from an observer perspective, can be expected to put excessive weight on the outcome, 
while attributing little weight to the perpetrator’s mental states. For both bystanders and victims, 
we can expect the outcome effect to be stronger than in the perpetrators’ self-assessment. For 
victims, there is some evidence of this pattern: They tend to exaggerate the negative 
consequences of unfair treatment and view them as a persistent pattern of misbehavior on the 
perpetrator’s behalf (Baumeister, 1999; Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990). But we can also 
expect a difference between victims and bystanders: Since victims are involved in the focal 
action (Adams & Inesi, 2017; Jones & Nisbett, 1972) and directly affected by the action’s 
outcome (McCullough, Fincham, & Tsang, 2003), their tendency to base their judgment on the 
severity of outcome should be stronger than that of bystanders. In short, we predict the outcome 
effect to be larger among victims than among bystanders, and to be weaker among perpetrators 
than among bystanders. 
Agentic and Communal Interpersonal Goals 
We draw on the needs-based model (Shnabel & Nadler, 2008; Shnabel & Nadler, 2015) to 
understand how dispositions for moral action emerge. According to this model, moral 
transgressions asymmetrically threaten victims’ and perpetrators’ identities and elicit different 
needs. To the extent that they view an action as immoral, the needs-based model assumes 
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perpetrators to suffer from a threat to their identity as moral actors, whereas victims are assumed 
to suffer from a threat to their identity as agentic actors. As most people seek to maintain positive 
identities, both victims and perpetrators experience diverging needs. Perpetrators should feel a 
heightened need for social acceptance, whereas victims should experience a heightened need for 
empowerment. To restore their threatened identities, perpetrators pursue communal goals 
(communion refers to “the self as part of the community and is geared toward closeness, 
affection, and cooperation”; Grosse Holtforth, Thomas, & Caspar, 2011, p. 109), whereas victims 
pursue agentic goals (agency refers to “the pursuit of independence and autonomy of the 
individual and aims at control, assertiveness and self-enhancement”; Grosse Holtforth et al., 
2011, p. 109).  
An important moderator of the effects of social role on agentic and communal goals is the 
extent to which the conflict parties view the action as immoral. For example, if perpetrators deny 
their perpetrator role, the model does not predict increased communion. In fact, in many 
protracted conflicts there is competition for the victim role (e.g., Noor, Shnabel, Halabi, & 
Nadler, 2012) and where there is ambiguity with regard to the roles of victim and perpetrator, the 
agentic goals associated with the victim role are more pronounced (SimanTov-Nachlieli, Shnabel, 
Aydin, & Ullrich, 2018). Thus, the assumption bridging the need-based model with the moral 
luck literature is that the harshness of moral judgment, capturing perpetrator’s moral debt to the 
victim, should determine whether and to what extent the perpetrator has communal goals vis-à-
vis the victim and the victim has agentic goals vis-à-vis the perpetrator. If so, outcome severity, 
which we assume to affect moral judgment, should have implications for the interpersonal goals 
of perpetrators and victims as well. More specifically, victims’ interpersonal goals should also 
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vary more strongly between situations with negative and neutral outcomes than perpetrators’ 
interpersonal goals. The predominant goal of victims would be to act agentically toward the 
perpetrator, whereas the predominant goal of the perpetrator would be to act communally toward 
the victim. We propose that bystanders share the perspective of victims when interacting with the 
perpetrator, thus responding with victim-type interpersonal goals (i.e., agency) in proportion to 
their moral judgments. In contrast, when bystanders interact with victims, we assume them to 
approach victims with communion, thus responding with perpetrator-type interpersonal goals. 
Although not specified in the needs-based model, there is evidence that an increase in 
victim goals (i.e., agency) is accompanied by a decrease of perpetrator goals (i.e., communion) 
and vice versa. Research extending the needs-based model to the context of social class found 
that when people imagined interactions with members of a higher social class, they wanted to act 
more agentically and less communally compared with social interactions within their own social 
class. Conversely, when people imagined interactions with members of a lower social class, they 
wanted to act more communally and less agentically (Aydin, Ullrich, Siem, Locke, & Shnabel, 
2019). It is plausible that such patterns are also present in perpetrators’ and victims’ interactions 
after transgressions. Compared with bystanders, victims might simultaneously pursue more 
agency (i.e., their role-specific goal) and less communion, whereas perpetrators might 
simultaneously pursue more communion (i.e., their role-specific goal) and less agency. 
The Present Research 
We conducted three preregistered online studies to examine how social role moderates the 
outcome effect on moral judgment and resulting interpersonal goals (for preregistrations, data, 
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analyses, materials, and online appendix, see https://osf.io/t7e2k/). Study 1 contrasted 
participants’ reactions to a moral scenario in the social roles of perpetrator and victim. Studies 2 
and 3 were conducted to replicate the effects with a different moral scenario and to examine the 
prediction that the outcome effects among bystanders are weaker than among victims, but 
stronger than among perpetrators.  
Our suggested explanation for the moderating effects of social role on the outcome effect 
assumes that the subjective, role-specific patterns arising in actual transgressions extend to 
vignette-based evaluations from imagined role-specific perspectives. Feltz, Harris, and Perez 
(2012) call this premise into question on the basis of several studies on epistemic state 
ascriptions, where actor-observer differences in an actual economic game do not replicate in 
imagined-role vignette studies. Kneer (2018) partially reinstates it and emphasizes that triggering 
role-specific imagination can require extensive preliminary exercises. However, there is some 
evidence from imagination-based experiments that suggests that the proposed hypotheses are on 
track: Stillwell and Baumeister (1997), for example, found that participants imagining themselves 
in a perpetrator role focused more heavily on mitigating circumstances and frequently invoked 
mental state information, whereas victims emphasized the severity of the offense. Studies by 
Exline, Yali, and Lobel (1998) as well as Adams and Inesi (2016; experiments 3 and 5) suggest 
that when individuals are placed into an imagined perpetrator instead of the victim role, they see 
their transgressions as less harmful, frequent, intentional, and malicious. Finally, Leunissen, De 
Cremer, Reinders Folmer, and Van Dijke (2013) found the same differences between perpetrators 
and victims regarding their needs for apologies across studies using remembered actual 
transgressions or scenarios that were only imagined. Thus, viewed in the context of similar 
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previous studies, the scenario-based methodology chosen for the present research appears to be 
appropriate.  
Study 1 
The objective of Study 1 was to investigate the outcome effect on moral judgment and 
interpersonal goals of the parties involved in a transgression (i.e. perpetrator and victim). Bad 
outcomes should elicit harsher moral judgments and stronger role-specific goals (i.e., agency for 
victims and communion for perpetrators) than neutral outcomes. Drawing on the introspection 
illusion (Pronin, 2009), we hypothesized that the social role in which transgressions are perceived 
would moderate the outcome effect. Given that outcome-related information will be factored in 
more strongly by victims than by perpetrators, victims should exhibit a stronger outcome effect 
than perpetrators. Note that we preregistered only effects on agency. To expand the preregistered 
pattern to moral judgments and communion seemed meaningful post hoc. However, the effects 
on the latter variables need to be interpreted with caution. 
Method 
To test our hypothesis, we conducted an online study, using vignettes for experimental 
manipulation. The study had a 2x2x2 design with outcome (neutral vs. bad) as a within-subjects 
factor and social role (perpetrator vs. victim) and mental states (unintended vs. intended) as 
between-subjects factors. To address outcome sensitivity among perpetrators and victims, we 
manipulated outcome severity within-subjects. This increases the manipulations’ validity as it 
creates a stable comparative context rather than leaving it up to participants to construe a 
comparison for judging the experimental stimuli (Birnbaum, 1999). Moreover, manipulating the 
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factor of interest within-subjects decreases error variance, thereby increasing the statistical power 
(Birnbaum & Mellers, 1983). Although the focus of the study lies on the outcome effect, we 
additionally manipulated mental states, as prior research has shown that people tend to draw 
inferences from outcome severity to the agent’s intentions (e.g., Fincham, 1982; for a discussion 
see Malle, 2014). By explicitly stating whether the actor intended to harm the victim we sought to 
rule out the possibility that participants use outcome severity as a proxy for intentions. Note, 
however, that mental states are merely a control variable and not part of our preregistered 
hypotheses.  
Participants  We recruited 116 participants by snowball sampling mainly among 
students at a large Swiss university.1 Following our preregistered plan, we excluded all 
participants who (i) failed to correctly answer the comprehension check, (ii) failed to correctly 
answer the manipulation check, or (iii) did not complete the whole survey (for details see online 
appendix). The final sample included 107 participants (85 women, 21 men, one not specifying 
gender, Mdnage = 21, range 18 – 36). This sample size affords a power of .73 to detect a 
medium-sized effect (!"#= 0.06), assuming an alpha of 5%. 
After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned 
to the between-subjects conditions of the factorial design. Participants then read two scenarios 
 
1 Additionally, we recruited 115 participants for an experimental design in which outcome severity was a between-
subjects factor and mental states a within-subjects factor. However, as we did not preregister any hypothesis about 
the outcome effect in that design and the results do not inform the present manuscript, we do not report the results in 
detail. 
Procedure 
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(adopted from Cushman, 2008) with an action leading to a neutral or bad outcome. We held the 
order of the vignettes fixed, always beginning with the neutral outcome. Vignettes differed solely 
in their crucial words to manipulate treatment conditions. The following vignette was presented 
to participants in the perpetrator (victim) condition, when actions ended in a neutral outcome:  
Imagine you are taking a class in sculpture. You are assigned to work with a partner to 
weld together pieces of metal. You do (Your partner does) not want to burn your partner’s (your) 
hand. You (Your partner) only want(s) to weld together the metal. You do (Your partner does) not 
think that if you (he) weld(s) a piece of metal that your partner is (you are) holding, the heat will 
travel down the metal and burn your partner’s (your) hand. You (Your partner) think(s) that the 
metal will weld without causing your partner (you) any injury at all. You (Your partner) weld(s) 
the metal but your partner happens (you happen) to let go and is (and are) not burned at all.  
For vignettes that ended with a negative outcome solely the last sentence changed: You 
(Your partner) weld(s) the metal and your partner’s (your) hand is burned). 
Measures  
Moral Judgment  After each experimental vignette, participants rated the 
permissibility and wrongness of the action, and how much blame and punishment the actor 
deserved on scales from 1 to 5. We averaged the items wrongness, blame and (reverse-scored) 
permissibility after finding satisfactory internal consistency (Cronbach’s $%&ℎ$ = .81). We 
analyzed punishment ratings separately because recent research suggests a unique effect of 
outcome on punishment, in that people are even more sensitive to outcome severity when judging 
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deserved punishment, compared to permissibility, wrongness, and blame (Kneer & Machery, 
2019). 
To measure interpersonal goals, we used the German version 
of the Circumplex Scales of Intergroup Goals (CSIG; Locke, 2014), adapted to the interpersonal 
level as in Aydin et al. (2019). The CSIG consists of eight four-item scales each representing one 
octant in the circumplex (see Figure 1). Upper and lower octants along the vertical axis define 
high and low agency scores, whereas right and left octants along the horizontal axis define high 
and low communal scores. Each point within the circumplex represents a weighted mixture of 
agency and communion. 
Interpersonal Goals 
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Figure 1. Circumplex of interpersonal goals (octants depicted with dotted lines). 
After each experimental vignette (neutral or bad outcome), participants rated the 32 items 
of the CSIG. Specifically, they were asked to imagine an interaction with their partner from the 
experimental vignette and rate the respective goals from 1 = not important to 5 = very important: 
“When I interact with my partner it is important to me that … [e.g. I show concern for their 
welfare, I understand their point of view (example communal items) or I am assertive, I appear 
confident (example agentic items)”. We calculated an overall agency score by combining the 
octant scores as follows: agentic goals = .414 × (PA – HI + (.707 × [BC + NO – JK – FG]; note 
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that each octant has by convention a generic two letter code). This score represents a participant’s 
position on the vertical dimension in the circumplex shown in Figure 1. Likewise, we calculated 
an overall communal score by combining the octant scores as follows: communal goals = .414 × 
(LM – DE + (.707 × [JK + NO – BC – FG]; Leary, 1957; Locke 2014). This score represents a 
participant’s position on the horizontal dimension in the circumplex shown in Figure 1. 
Cronbach’s α were .85 for agentic goals and .95 for communal goals (see supplemental material 
for Cronbach’s α of the octant scores). 
Results2 
Hypothesis Tests3 We conducted 2(social role[perpetrator, victim]) x 
2(outcome[neutral, bad]) x 2(mental state[unintended, intended]) ANOVAs with repeated 
measures on the second factor on moral judgment, punishment, agency and communion. Our key 
hypothesis addressed the moderating influence of social role on the outcome effect (i.e., an 
interaction between social role and outcome). We expected that victims would exhibit a stronger 
outcome effect than perpetrators.  
 
2 We used R (Version 3.4.3; R Core Team, 2017b) and the R-packages afex (Version 0.20.2; Singmann, Bolker, 
Westfall, & Aust, 2016), psy (Version 1.1; Falissard, 2012), emmeans (Version 1.4.2; Lenth, 2019), dplyr (Version 
0.8.3; Wickham, François, Henry, & Müller, 2019), tidyr (Version 1.0.0; Wickham & Henry, 2019), and taRifx 
(Version 1.0.6.1; Friedman, 2018) for analyses of the three studies. We created the Figures using the R-package 
ggplot2 (Wickham, 2016).  
3 Following our preregistration, we tested our hypotheses with alpha = 5%, one-sided tests, without adjustment for 
multiple comparisons.  
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Starting with moral judgment, there was a significant interaction effect of social role and 
outcome ()(1,103) = 4.92, & = .029, !"# = .05, d = .41), indicating that, as predicted, victims 
showed stronger outcome effects than perpetrators. Table 1 shows means and standard deviations 
as well as test statistics associated with the simple main effects of outcome within each social 
role condition. As can be seen in the right column of Table 1, victims judged transgressions more 
harshly when resulting in a bad outcome than in a neutral outcome. By contrast, perpetrators’ 
outcome effects on moral judgment were non-significant. 
These diverging outcome effects are shown as the distributions of difference scores 
(moral judgment following bad outcome minus moral judgment following neutral outcome) in 
upper left-hand side of Figure 2. The expansion of the density plot represents the frequency of 
observations. Means and 95% confidence intervals are shown within the violin-shaped plots. 
Inspection of the plot further shows that in both social role conditions, the violin’s expansion is 
greatest at the value of zero, which means that a typical response pattern (27 % of participants) 
was to make identical moral judgments across outcome conditions. 
For punishment judgments, there was only a main effect of outcome, ()(1,103) = 25.61, & < .001, !"# = .2). Participants reported actions that produced negative outcomes to deserve 
more punishment (7 = 2.96, 89 = 1.28) than actions that produced neutral outcomes (7 =2.57, 89 = 1.15). The outcome x social role interaction was non-significant ()(1,103) = 0.39, & = .53, !"# = .00). As illustrated in the upper right-hand side of Figure 2, perpetrators and 
victims exhibited similar outcome effects on punishment. 
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Figure 2. Violin plot of the difference scores (bad – neutral outcome) of perpetrators’ and 
victims’ moral judgments (permissibility, wrongness, blame), punishment judgments, agency, 
and communion (Study 1). Points represent means, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, 
and the width of density plots represent the frequency of observations.
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Simple Main Effects of Outcome on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals (Study 1) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are given for perpetrators’ and victims’ moral judgments, punishment judgments, 
agency, and communion after neutral and bad outcomes. Test statistics (t) and p-values, effect sizes (dz) and their 95% confidence 
intervals (CI) are given for the simple main effects of outcome (bad – neutral). 
 Perpetrator  Victim 
Variable neutral bad t p dz CI 
 neutral bad t p dz CI 
Moral Judgment 3.33 
(1.21) 
3.44 
(1.14) 
0.99   .326 0.09 [0.32, -
0.13] 
 3.58 
(1.05) 
4.03 
(0.91) 
4.21 <.001 0.46 [0.64, 
0.27] 
Punishment 2.46 
(1.21) 
2.90 
(1.35) 
3.96 <.001 0.34 [0.53, 
0.16] 
 2.67 
(1.09) 
3.02 
(1.22) 
3.19   .002 0.29 [0.47, 
0.12] 
Agency -0.11 
(0.71) 
-0.23 
(0.75) 
-1.15   .245 -0.16 [0.09,      
-0.41] 
 0.54 
(0.73) 
0.77 
(0.79) 
2.6   .005 0.3 [0.53, 
0.07] 
Communion 1.47 
(1.33) 
1.53 
(1.49) 
0.38   .703 0.04 [0.18,      
-0.1] 
 0.89 
(1.07) 
0.54 
(1.36) 
-3.86 <.001 -0.25 [-0.13, 
-0.36] 
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Regarding agency, results revealed an interaction of social role and outcome (!(1,103) =6.93, , = .009,	./0  = .06). As predicted, victims reported stronger agentic goals after 
transgressions leading to bad outcomes than neutral outcomes (see right column of Table 1). In 
contrast, perpetrators reported slightly weaker agentic goals after bad rather than neutral 
outcomes, but this difference was non-significant (see left column of Table 1). Thus, victims and 
perpetrators showed outcome effects in opposite directions (see lower left-hand side of Figure 2). 
To compare the strength of outcome effects across social roles, we tested whether the negative 
deviation from zero observed among perpetrators was smaller than the positive deviation from 
zero observed among victims. In terms of the absolute deviation from zero, we found that the 
difference in the strength of victims’ and perpetrators’ outcome effects was non-significant (b = 
0.12, t(103) = 0.98, p = .164, d = .17). 
However, analyses of communion yielded support for our hypothesis: Social role 
interacted with outcome (!(1,103) = 8.73, , = .004, ./0 = .08), such that outcome severity 
influenced victim’s communion, being weaker when the outcome was bad rather than neutral (see 
right column of Table 1). As illustrated in lower right-hand side of Figure 2, perpetrators showed 
the reversed pattern, reporting stronger communal goals after negative rather than neutral 
outcomes, but again this difference was not significant (see left column of Table 1). In terms of 
the absolute deviation from zero, the outcome effect was stronger for victims than for 
perpetrators (b = 0.31, t(103) =  2.41, p = .009, d = .43). To summarize, results show the 
predicted outcome x social role interaction, such that victims showed larger outcome effects than 
perpetrators on moral judgment and communion. For agency the predicted pattern is visible 
though not significant.  
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Secondary Analyses   In this section, we discuss effects of social role and mental 
states, which are not part of our hypotheses but interesting in their own right.  
There was a main effect of social role on moral judgment (!(1,103) = 4.34, , = .04, ./0 = .04), such that victims judged transgressions more harshly (4 = 3.80, 56 = 1) than 
perpetrators (4 = 3.38, 56 = 1.17). However, for punishment judgments this main effect of 
social role was non-significant (!(1,103) = 0.04, , = .85, ./0 = .00). Consistent with the basic 
assumptions of the needs-based model (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), main effects of social role on 
agency (!(1,103) = 43.29, , < .001, ./0 = .3) and communion (!(1,103) = 9.72, , = .002, ./0 = .09) suggest that perpetrators and victims differed in their interpersonal goals: After 
transgressions, victims reported stronger agentic goals (4 = 0.66, 56 = 0.76) than perpetrators 
(4 = −0.17, 56 = 0.73), while perpetrators reported stronger communal goals (4 =1.50, 56 = 1.40) than victims (4 = 0.71, 56 = 1.23).  
Mental states, which we manipulated as a control variable, yielded main effects on all four 
dependent variables (!(1,103) > 17.16, , < .001, ./0 > .14), such that intended actions elicited 
harsher moral judgments and punishment judgments, as well as stronger role-specific goals, than 
unintended actions. However, mental states did not interact with social role and outcome for 
neither of the dependent variables (!(1,103) < 2.15, , > .145, ./0 < .02;	see online appendix 
for a full report of analyses). Therefore, we collapsed the two mental state conditions in the above 
figures and contrast analyses relating to our hypotheses. 
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Discussion 
Study 1 provides first evidence that the outcome effect depends on the social role in which 
transgressions are perceived. Although many participants made identical moral judgments for 
neutral and bad outcomes (confirming Kneer & Machery, 2019), our results revealed a reliable 
average outcome effect on moral judgment among victims but not among perpetrators. By 
contrast, punishment judgments of victims and perpetrators were similarly influenced by outcome 
severity. With regards to interpersonal goals, victims indicated more agency and less communion 
towards the perpetrator in the bad outcome condition than when the consequence was neutral. For 
perpetrators, outcome effects on both agency and communion were non-significant. Overall, the 
results were generally in line with predictions, but not consistently supported by significant 
interactions, which might in part be explained by the relatively low statistical power. 
Two further limitations concerning our study design restrict the conclusiveness of 
findings: First, we did not balance the order of the two vignettes presented to each participant. 
Second, because we limited the design to the social roles of perpetrator and victim, we cannot say 
whether the outcome effect among bystanders is weaker than among victims and stronger than 
among perpetrators. Study 2 was conducted to overcome these limitations by balancing the order 
of vignettes and including a bystander condition. Furthermore, as mental states did not interfere 
with the outcome effect across social roles, we omitted the mental state manipulation in Study 2. 
Finally, given our interest in the moderating effect of social role on the outcome effect, it was 
reasonable to use a scenario where outcome effects are likely to be strongest. As prior research 
showed that the outcome effect is most pronounced in cases of negligent behavior (e.g. Cushman, 
2008), we changed the content of our vignette to a clear negligence case. 
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Study 2 
As in Study 1, the key hypothesis underlying this extended design addressed the 
moderating influence of social role on the outcome effect. Being the victim in the scenario should 
elicit a stronger outcome effect than being a bystander. Being the perpetrator in the scenario 
should elicit a weaker outcome effect. Assuming that the harshness of the moral judgments 
determines the strength of interpersonal goals, we expected that the effects of outcome would 
also manifest in the parties’ interpersonal goals, such that for victims and bystanders, bad 
outcomes elicit stronger agentic goals and weaker communal goals towards the perpetrator than 
neutral outcomes. For perpetrators, by contrast, bad outcomes should elicit stronger communal 
goals and weaker agentic goals towards the victim than neutral outcomes. 
Method 
The study had a 2x3x2 design with outcome (neutral vs. bad) as a within-subjects factor 
and social role (perpetrator vs. bystander vs. victim) and order of vignettes (neutral first vs. bad 
outcome first) as between-subjects factors. We induced experimental manipulations of social role 
and outcome in an online vignette study. 
We recruited a total of 300 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
with their IP address location restricted to the USA. After excluding participants based on our 
preregistered criteria (i.e. attention check, comprehension check, native language, time to 
complete the survey, completion of the survey; for details see online appendix), the final sample 
included 267 participants (141 women and 126 men, Mdnage = 36, range 20 – 71). This sample 
size affords a power of .88 to detect a medium-sized effect (./0= 0.06), assuming an alpha of 1%. 
Participants 
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After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned 
to the cells of the between-subjects portion of the design. We consecutively presented 
participants with two vignettes (adopted from Kneer & Machery, 2019) each of which contained 
a scenario in which identical negligent behavior led to either a neutral or bad outcome. For 
example, the vignette below represents the neutral outcome scenario we used in the bystander 
condition. 
Beth takes care of Mary’s 2-year-old son. She fills the bath, while Mary’s son stands near 
the tub. The phone rings in the next room. Beth tells Mary’s son to stand near the tub while she 
answers the phone. Beth believes Mary’s son will stand near the tub for a few minutes and wait 
for her to return. Beth leaves the room for 5 minutes. When Beth returns, Mary’s son is still 
standing near the tub. The boy then enjoys his bath. 
The vignettes in the bad outcome condition included a caretaker called “Anna” (while the 
mother’s name remained “Mary”) and concluded with the sentence: When Anna returns, Mary’s 
son is in the tub, dead, face down in the water. Note that names of the interaction partner only 
changed in the perpetrator condition, not in the bystander condition. The order of scenario 
presentation was randomized. In the victim condition, participants read the vignettes in the 
parent’s role. In the perpetrator condition, participants read the vignettes in the caretaker’s role. 
Otherwise the vignettes were identical across treatment conditions. 
 
 
 
Procedure 
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Measures 
Moral Judgment  We assessed moral judgments as in Study 1. We averaged the 
permissibility (reversed), wrongness and blame items after finding satisfactory internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s = = .82). As explained in Study 1, we analyzed punishment separately. 
Interpersonal Goals We measured interpersonal goals as in Study 1. Cronbach’s α were 
.85 for agency and .85 for communion (see online appendix for Cronbach’s α of the octant 
scores).  
Results 
Preliminary Analyses  To examine the effect of the order of vignettes presented to 
participants (neutral vs. bad outcome first), we ran 3(social role [perpetrator vs. bystander vs. 
victim]) x 2(outcome[neutral vs. bad]) x 2(order[neutral outcome first vs. bad outcome first]) 
ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor on the four dependent variables. Order 
moderated the effect of outcome on moral judgment and punishment (outcome x order interaction !(1,261) = 4.21, , = .041, ./0 = 0.02, for moral judgment, and (!(1,261) = 4.11, , =.045, ./0 = 	0.02	for punishment), as well as interpersonal goals (outcome x social role x order 
interaction (!(2,261) = 6.91, , < .001, ./0 = 	0.05	for agency, and !(2,261) = 30.98, , <.001, ./0 = 0.19 for communion). Outcome effects were considerably smaller when the bad 
outcome preceded the neutral outcome (for details see online appendix). As our primary interest 
was the moderating influence of social role on the outcome effects, we included only participants 
who were presented with the neutral outcome vignette first for subsequent hypotheses tests. 
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 Hypotheses Tests4 We ran 3(social role [perpetrator vs. bystander vs. victim]) x 
2(outcome[neutral vs. bad]) ANOVAs with repeated measures on the second factor on moral 
judgment, punishment, agency and communion. Our key hypothesis addressed the interaction of 
social role and outcome. Compared to bystanders, we expected the outcome effect to be stronger 
for victims and weaker for perpetrators. 
Starting with moral judgment, the interaction of outcome with social role was non-
significant (!(2,122) = 1.39, , = .254, ./0 = .02). As shown in the upper left-hand side of 
Figure 3, and contrary to our hypothesis, outcome effects were similarly strong and significant 
across social roles. This was confirmed by a main effect of outcome (!(1,122) = 70.85, , <.001, ./0 = .37): Although, as in Study 1, the most frequent response was to make the same 
moral judgment across outcome conditions (41 % of participants), transgressions that ended in a 
bad outcome were on average judged more harshly (4 = 4.78, 56 = 0.48) than transgressions 
ending in a neutral outcome (4 = 4.15, 56 = 0.92).  
As for moral judgment, analyses of punishment judgments revealed a non-significant 
outcome x social role interaction (!(2,122) = 2.07, , = .13, ./0 = .03), but a significant main 
effect of outcome (!(1,122) = 236.82, , < .001, ./0 = .66): Mean deserved punishment in the 
bad outcome condition (4 = 4.63, 56 = 0.78) exceeded punishment in the neutral outcome 
 
4 Following the preregistration, we tested our hypotheses with alpha = 1%, one-sided tests, without further 
adjustment for multiple comparisons. 
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condition (4 = 2.88, 56 = 1.22). The size of the effect of outcome on punishment was more 
pronounced than the effect of punishment on moral judgment. 
 
Figure 3. Violin plot of the difference scores (bad – neutral outcome) of perpetrators’, 
bystanders’, and victims’ moral judgments (permissibility, wrongness, blame), punishment 
judgments, agency, and communion (Study 2). Points represent means, error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals, and the width of density plots represent the frequency of observations. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics and Simple Main Effects of Outcome on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals (Study 2) 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are given for perpetrators’, bystanders’, and victims’ moral judgments, 
punishment judgments, agency, and communion after neutral and bad outcomes. Test statistics (t) and p-values (p), effect sizes (dz) and 
their 95% confidence intervals (CI) are given for the simple main effects of outcome (bad – neutral). 
 Perpetrator  Bystander    Victim 
Variable neutral bad t p dz CI  neutral bad t p dz CI  neutral bad t p dz CI 
Moral 
Judgment 
4.33 
(0.72) 
4.79 
(0.46) 
3.65 <.001 0.73 [1.06, 
0.41] 
 3.88 
(1.13) 
4.64 
(0.6) 
6.06 <.001 0.81 [1.2, 
0.42] 
 4.26 
(0.82) 
4.9 
(0.22) 
4.88 <.001 0.93 [1.34, 
0.53] 
Punishment 2.89 
(1.23) 
4.46 
(0.81) 
7.5 <.001 1.38 [1.89, 
0.87] 
 2.70 
(1.17) 
4.14 
(1.04) 
8.97 <.001 1.64 [2.23, 
1.04] 
 2.71 
(1.20) 
4.47 
(0.86) 
10.16 <.001 2.17 [2.89, 
1.45] 
Agency -0.13 
(0.57) 
-0.32 
(0.64) 
-1.46   .147 -0.32 [-0.03, 
-0.6] 
 0.49 
(0.70) 
1.17 
(0.99) 
5.31 <.001 0.79 [1.19, 
0.39] 
 0.66 
(0.77) 
1.72 
(1.01) 
7.96 <.001 1.16 [1.56, 
0.75] 
Communion 1.38 
(0.78) 
1.82 
(1.12) 
2.72   .008 .4 [0.6, 
0.2] 
 0.81 
(0.95) 
-0.19 
(1.23) 
6.31 <.001 -0.9 [-0.48, 
-1.31] 
 1.25 
(0.87) 
-0.78 
(1.04) 
-12.46 <.001 -2.1 [-1.5, -
2.71] 
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Next, we tested whether social role moderated the outcome effect on interpersonal goals. 
Analyses yielded significant social role x outcome interactions for agentic goals (!(2,122) =23.91, + < .001, η/0 = .28) and communal goals (!(2,122) = 59.17, + < .001,η/0 = .49). Bad 
outcomes elicited stronger agentic goals and weaker communal goals than neutral outcomes 
among victims and bystanders (see right and middle column of Table 2), whereas perpetrators 
reported less agency and more communion after bad rather than neutral outcomes (see left 
column of Table 2). As predicted, in terms of the absolute deviation from zero, we found that 
victims’ outcome effects were stronger than those of bystanders’ on both agentic (t(122) = 2.04, p 
= .022, d = .39)5 and communal goals (t(122) = 4.59, p = <.001, d = .89). Also as predicted, 
bystanders’ outcome effects were stronger than perpetrators’ outcome effects on both agentic 
(t(122) = 2.7, p = .004, d = .61) and communal goals (t(122) = 2.5, p = .007, d = .55). The 
patterns of results are depicted in Figure 3 for both agency and communion. 
Interestingly, the means shown in Table 2 indicate that the divergence of the interpersonal 
goals of perpetrators, bystanders and victims was particularly marked after transgressions that 
ended in a bad outcome. This result supports our assumption that victims and bystanders put 
greater weight on negative outcome information than perpetrators rather than responding 
particularly mildly after the absence of negative outcomes. 
 
5 According to our preregistered alpha level of 1% we are strictly speaking not able to infer differences in the 
outcome effect on agentic goals among victims and bystanders. The status of this hypothesis will be clarified in 
Study 3.  
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Secondary Analyses  In this section we report main effects of social role on moral 
judgment and interpersonal goals. A main effect of social role on moral judgment (!(2,122) =3.85, + = .024, 5/0 = .06) revealed that victims judged transgressions more harshly (7 =4.58, 89 = 0.69) than bystanders (7 = 4.26, 89 = 0.98, :(122) = 	2.45, + = 	 .015, d = .38), 
and so did perpetrators (7 = 4.56, 89 = 0.65, :(122) = 	2.99, + = 	 .021, < = 	 .36). As in Study 
1, the main effect of social role was non-significant for punishment judgments (!(2,122) =1.26, + = .29, 5/0 = .02). 
 Consistent with Study 1, main effects of social role on agency (!(2,122) = 49.25, + <.001, 5/0 = .45) and communion (!(2,122) = 32.43, + < .001, 5/0 = .35) supported the needs-
based model (Shnabel & Nadler, 2015): Victims indicated stronger agentic goals (7 =1.19, 89 = 1.04) than perpetrators (7 = −0.22, 89 = 0.61, :(122) = 9.78; 	+ < 	 .001, <	 =1.67), whereas perpetrators indicated stronger communal goals (7 = 1.6, 89 = 0.98) than 
victims (7 = 0.23, 89 = 1.40; :(122) = 	7.69, + < 	 .001, < = 1.13). Comparisons with the 
bystander condition revealed that the differences between victims and perpetrators represent 
actual increases or decreases in agency and communion resulting from direct involvement in the 
moral transgression: Bystanders exhibited less agency (7 = 0.83, 89 = 0.92) than victims  (:(122) = 	−2.42, + = 	 .017, < = 	−.37), but more agency than perpetrators (	:(122) =7.51, + < 	 .001, < = 1.36). With regard to communion, bystanders reported less communal goals 
(7 = 0.31, 89 = 1.20) than perpetrators (:(122) = −7.38, + < 	 .001, < = 	−1.17). The 
comparison of bystanders’ and victims’ communal goals, however, was non-significant (:(122) = 0.63, + = 	 .531, < = 	 .06).  
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Discussion 
Study 2 revealed that the outcome effect depends on the order in which neutral and bad 
outcomes are presented to participants. When the bad outcome was presented first, outcome 
effects on moral judgment and interpersonal goals were negligible. By contrast, when participants 
judged the neutral outcome first (as in Study 1), outcome effects on moral judgment emerged for 
all social roles. This order effect is consistent with the negative information bias, such that 
negative information influences subsequent evaluations more heavily than neutral information 
(Ito, Larsen, Smith, & Cacioppo, 1998; see also Young & Tsoi, 2013). When participants were 
presented with a negative outcome first, they seem to have difficulty ignoring information about 
the bad outcome when subsequently judging an action that ended in a neutral outcome. A fixed 
order of vignettes, with the neutral outcome vignette preceding the bad outcome vignette, 
therefore seems to be a methodological prerequisite to examine the outcome effect. 
Focusing on the subset of participants who received the neutral outcome vignette first, we 
found that the outcome effects on moral judgment and punishment judgments were equally 
strong regardless of the social role participants assumed. However, consistent with our hypothesis 
about interpersonal goals, social role moderated outcome effects on agency and communion: 
Victims showed the strongest outcome effects and perpetrators showed the weakest outcome 
effects, with bystanders falling in between. Thus, Study 2 failed to replicate the interaction of 
outcome and social role on moral judgment but increased our confidence in the existence of this 
interaction on agency and communion.  
However, the findings of Study 2 are constrained by a few methodological limitations: 
First of all, our bystander condition was confounded in that we asked all bystanders to imagine an 
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interaction with the perpetrator when indicating their interpersonal goals. Thus, it is unclear 
whether differences in outcome effects between bystanders and perpetrators are in fact due to 
stepping into different social roles as assumed by our theoretical reasoning. Alternatively, the 
outcome effects among bystanders might be stronger because they interacted with perpetrators 
and perpetrators interacted with victims. To obtain conclusive evidence, a second bystander 
condition is necessary in which bystanders interact with victims.  
Second, the names used in our vignettes changed for the perpetrator (caretaker) among 
neutral and bad vignettes, where vignettes ending in a neutral outcome contained a perpetrator 
(caretaker) called “Beth”, and vignettes ending in a bad outcome contained a perpetrator called 
“Anna”. The victim’s (mother) name, “Mary”, however was constant across both vignettes. This 
inconsistency may have exaggerated our outcome x social role interaction: As only the victim 
interacted with two different perpetrators this may have enhanced their outcome effect, whereas 
perpetrators constantly interacted with the same victim and therefore may have shown less of an 
outcome effect. Study 3 was conducted to overcome these limitations  
Study 3 
We extended the design and hypotheses of Study 2 based on findings and methodological 
shortcomings of Study 2. Again, we hypothesized that social role would moderate the outcome 
effect. Although Study 2 yielded only partial support for this hypothesis, we upheld our 
theoretically justified expectation that victims would exhibit a stronger outcome effect (harsher 
moral judgments, stronger agentic goals and weaker communal goals when the outcome is bad 
rather than neutral) than bystanders interacting with the perpetrator. And accordingly, bystanders 
interacting with the victim should exhibit a stronger outcome effect (stronger moral judgments, 
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weaker agentic goals and stronger communal goals when the outcome is bad rather than neutral) 
compared to perpetrators. 
To shed light on the mechanisms related to the outcome effect (as described in the 
introduction), we additionally assessed participants’ estimations of the probability that the action 
would produce harm as well as their negligence ascriptions. By doing so we aimed to examine 
whether participants’ perceived likelihood of a harmful outcome and their inferences to what 
degree perpetrators should have known their action would produce harm, mediate the effect of 
outcome severity on moral judgment (cf. Kneer & Machery, 2019). Although the study design 
does not allow for inferences about a causal relationship between negligence ascriptions, 
probability assessment and moral judgment as well as interpersonal goals, an inspection of the 
correlation between the within-subject effects of outcome serves as an indirect test of mediation. 
Method 
The study was a replication of Study 2 with an additional social role condition. Thus, the 
study had a 2x4 design with outcome (neutral vs. bad) as a within-subjects factor and social role 
(perpetrator vs. bystander interacting with victim vs. bystander interacting with perpetrator vs. 
victim) as a between-subjects factor.  
We recruited a total of 800 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 
with their IP address location restricted to the USA. After excluding participants as determined in 
the preregistered criteria (i.e. attention checks, comprehension checks, manipulation checks, 
native language, time to complete the survey, completion of the survey; for details see online 
appendix), the final sample included 576 participants (265 women and 311 men, Mdnage = 35, 
Participants 
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range 20 – 82). With this sample size, we had a power of .99 to detect a medium-sized effect 
(5/0= 0.06) using an alpha of 1 %. 
Procedure 
The procedure was in large parts identical with the one in Study 2 and differed only in the 
following respects: We held the order of the vignettes constant, always beginning with the neutral 
outcome. Moreover, we held the names of the protagonists constant across vignettes. And finally, 
we added a second bystander condition. Both bystander conditions differed solely in the 
assessment of interpersonal goals: Bystanders interacting with victims were asked to indicate 
their interpersonal goals towards the victim (Mary), whereas bystanders interacting with the 
perpetrator were asked to imagine an interaction with the perpetrator (Beth). Neither the vignette, 
nor the assessment of moral judgments differed across these two conditions. 
 
Moral Judgments We assessed moral judgments as in Study 1 and 2. We averaged the 
permissibility (reversed), wrongness and blame items after determining a high degree of internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s ? = .86). As explained in Study 1, we analyzed punishment separately. 
Interpersonal goals We assessed interpersonal goals as in Study 1 and 2. Cronbachs α 
were .87 for agency and .93 for communion. 
Probability and Negligence We assessed the perceived probability of a harmful outcome 
by asking participants “On a scale of 0-100 %, how high do you think was the probability of an 
accident? 0 % means the accident was completely improbable, 100 % means it was certain to 
Measures 
The Outcome Effect Among Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders 
 
 
 
37 
occur”. Moreover, we assessed perceived negligence of the perpetrator’s behavior by asking 
participants to indicate their agreement with the statement “Beth should have believed that there 
was a high probability of an accident” (or “I should have believed…” in the perpetrator 
condition) on a scale from 1 to 5.  
Results6 
 Hypotheses Tests We conducted 4(social role[perpetrator vs. bystander interacting 
with victim vs. bystander interacting with perpetrator vs. victim]) x 2(outcome[neutral vs. bad]) 
ANOVAs on moral judgment, punishment, agency, and communion with repeated measures on 
the second factor. Our main hypothesis addressed the moderating effect of social role on the 
outcome effect.  
Starting with moral judgments, in line with finding of Study 2 but contrary to predictions, 
the interaction of outcome and social role was non-significant (!(3,572) = 0.51, + = .673, 5/0 =.003). As depicted in Figure 4, the outcome effects were similarly strong across social role 
conditions. As was confirmed by a significant main effect of outcome (!(1,572) = 313.92, + <.001, η/0 = .35), bad outcomes on average elicited harsher judgments (7 = 4.73, 89 = 0.57) 
than neutral outcomes (7 = 4.18, 89 = 0.86). However, in line with Study 1 and 2, the most 
frequent response pattern (43 %) was to make equal judgments across outcome conditions. 
 
6 We tested our preregistered hypotheses with alpha = 1%, one-sided tests, without adjustment for multiple 
comparisons.  
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Figure 4. Violin plot of the difference scores (bad – neutral outcome) of perpetrators’, 
bystanders’, and victims’ moral judgments (permissibility, wrongness, blame), punishment 
judgments, agency, and communion (Study 3). Bystander_V indicates bystanders interacting with 
the victim, whereas Bystander_P indicates bystanders interacting with the perpetrator. Points 
represent means, error bars represent 95% confidence intervals, and the width of density plots 
represent the frequency of observations.  
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Similarly, analyses of punishment judgments yielded a non-significant outcome x social 
role interaction (!(3,572) = 1.62, + = .18, 5/0 = .008) but a significant main effect of outcome 
(!(1,572) = 1278.13, + < .001, 5/0 = .69). Across social roles, punishment in the bad outcome 
conditions (7 = 4.46, 89 = 0.85) exceeded punishment in the neutral outcome conditions (7 =2.80, 89 = 1.08; see Table 3a, 3b, and Figure 4). The outcome effect was more pronounced for 
punishment than for moral judgment.  
Next, we tested whether social role moderated the outcome effect on interpersonal goals. 
There were significant outcome x social role interaction effects on both agentic (!(3,572) =50.44, + < .001, 5/0 = .21) and communal goals (!(3,572) = 82.05, + < .001, 5/0 = .30).  
As predicted, victims’ increases in agency following the bad outcome were more 
pronounced than the increases in agency of bystanders interacting with the perpetrator (t(572) = 
3.34, p < .001, d = .42), and the decreases in agency of perpetrators (t(572) = 4.9,  p < .001, d = 
.6) confirming the result observed in Studies 1 and 2. One unexpected result apparent from the 
lower left plot in Figure 4 is that the outcome effect among perpetrators (decreases in agency) 
was stronger than the (non-significant) outcome effect among bystanders interacting with victims 
(t(572) = 2.53, p = .012, d = .28). However, as in Study 2, perpetrators’ outcome effect was 
significantly smaller than the outcome effect of bystanders interacting with perpetrators (t(572) = 
-1.71, p = .044, d = .22).  
The lower right plot in Figure 4 illustrates the pattern of outcome effects on communion 
across social role conditions. Statistical comparisons of simple main effects confirm the 
impression that the violin plot representing agency is virtually a mirror image of the violin plot 
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representing communion: As predicted, victim’s decreases in communion were stronger than the 
decreases in communion of bystanders interacting with the perpetrator (t(572) = 6.51, p <.001, d 
= .74) and the increases in communion of perpetrators (t(572) = 10.93, p <.001, d = 1.35) 
confirming the findings in Studies 1 and 2. Similar to the results observed for agency, the 
condition of bystanders interacting with the victim did not conform to predictions, with its 
outcome effect being indistinguishable from the outcome effect of perpetrators (t(572) = 0.15, p 
= .882, d = .02). Also unexpectedly, bystanders interacting with the victim showed less 
communion following the bad outcome. However, as in Study 2, perpetrators’ outcome effect 
was significantly smaller than the outcome effect of bystanders interacting with perpetrators 
(:(572) = −4.78, + < 	 .001, <	 = 	 .59). 
In line with Study 2, these diverging outcome effects emerged primarily due to greater 
variation between social role conditions in the negative outcome condition (for details see Table 
3a and 3b).
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Table 3a 
Descriptive Statistics and Simple Main Effects of Outcome on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals for Perpetrators and 
Bystanders interacting with Victims (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are given for perpetrators’ and bystanders’ (interacting with victims) moral 
judgments, punishment judgments, agency, and communion after neutral and bad outcomes. Test statistics (t) and p-values (p), effect 
sizes (dz) and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) are given for the simple main effects of outcome (bad – neutral).
 Perpetrator  Bystander interacting with victim 
Variable neutral bad t p dz CI  neutral bad t p dz CI 
Moral 
Judgment 
4.33 
(0.77) 
4.85 
(0.44) 
8.48 <.001 0.8 [1,      
0.6 ] 
 4.06 
(0.91) 
4.66 
(0.60) 
9.93 <.001 0.76 [0.96, 
0.56] 
Punishment 2.88 
(1.12) 
4.65 
(0.66) 
18.57 <.001 1.88 [2.22, 
1.52] 
 2.70 
(1.07) 
4.43 
(0.83) 
18.62 <.001 1.79 [2.08, 
1.5] 
Agency 0.09 
(0.76) 
-0.28 
(0.84) 
-4.69 <.001 -0.46 [-0.27, 
-0.66] 
 0.27 
(0.80) 
0.36 
(1.14) 
1.18   .235 0.09 [0.27, -
0.09] 
Communion 1.43 
(1.02) 
1.71 
(1.08) 
2.85   .002 0.26 [0.43, 
0.1] 
 1.08 
(1.15) 
0.78 
(1.53) 
-3.12   .001 -0.21 [-0.07, 
-0.36] 
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Table 3b 
Descriptive Statistics and Simple Main Effects of Outcome on Moral Judgment and Interpersonal Goals for Victims and Bystanders 
Interacting with Perpetrators (Study 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) are given for victims’ and bystanders’ (interacting with perpetrators) moral 
judgments, punishment judgments, agency, and communion after neutral and bad outcomes. Test statistics (t) and p-values (p), effect 
sizes (dz) and their 95% confidence intervals (CI) are given for the simple main effects of outcome (bad – neutral).
 Victim 
 
Bystander interacting with perpetrator 
Variable neutral bad t p dz CI 
 
neutral bad t p dz CI 
Moral 
Judgment 
4.18 
(0.93) 
4.68 
(0.65) 
7.94 <.001 0.59 [0.73, 
0.44] 
 4.17 
(0.83) 
4.71 
(0.56) 
9.14 <.001 0.73 [0.9, 
0.55] 
Punishment 2.70 
(1.02) 
4.39 
(0.98) 
17.46 <.001 1.68 [1.96, 
1.4] 
 2.89 
(1.10) 
4.39 
(0.90) 
16.83 <.001 1.49 [1.76, 
1.23] 
Agency 0.73 
(0.81) 
1.65 
(1.09) 
11.5 <.001 0.95 [1.14, 
0.75] 
 0.49 
(0.88) 
1.05 
(1.08) 
7.48 <.001 0.55 [0.69, 
0.43] 
Communion 1.03 
(1.10) 
-0.78 
(1.29) 
-18.14 <.001 -1.5 [-1.25, 
-1.75] 
 0.66 
(1.15) 
-0.26 
(1.29) 
-10 <.001 -0.75 [-0.59, 
-0.92] 
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 Secondary Analyses  In this section we report main effects of social role. 
Starting with moral judgments, we found a main effect of social role (!(3,572) = 3.31, , =.02, ./0 = .02), such that perpetrators judged transgressions more harshly (1 = 4.59, 45 =0.67) than bystanders interacting with victims (1 = 4.36, 45 = 0.83; 	:(572) = 3.05, , =	.002, ; = 	0.30) and victims (1 = 4.42, 45 = 0.84; 	:(572) = 2.16, , = 	 .031, ; = 	 .21). 
The difference in the harshness of judgments between victims and bystanders interacting with 
perpetrators (1 = 4.44, 45 = 0.75)	was non-significant (:(572) = −0.21; 	, = 	 .832, ; =	.02). In line with the findings of Study 1 and 2, there was no significant main effect of social 
role on punishment (!(3,572) = 2.26, , = .08, ./0 = .01). 
Study 3 again supported the basic predictions of the needs-based model (Shnabel & 
Nadler, 2015). Analyses revealed main effects of social role on agency (!(3,572) = 65.23, , < .001, ./0 = .23) and communion (!(3,572) = 57.93, , < .001, ./0 = .23). After 
transgressions, victims indicated stronger agentic goals (1 = 1.19, 45 = 1.06) than 
perpetrators (1 = −0.1, 45 = 0.82, :(572	) = 	13.12, , < 	 .001, ; = 1.36), whereas 
perpetrators reported stronger communal goals (1 = 1.57, 45 = 1.06) than victims (1 =0.12, 45 = 1.50, :(572	) = 	11.23, , < 	 .001, ; = 1.12). Comparisons with the bystander 
condition replicated the findings of Study 2: Bystanders exhibited less agency towards the 
perpetrator (1 = 0.77, 45 = 1.02)	 than victims (:(572	) = 	−4.4, , < 	 .001, ; = 	−.40), 
but more agency towards the victim (1 = 0.32, 45 = 0.98)	than perpetrators (	:(572) =	4.29, , < 	 .001, ; = 	 .45). Bystanders also reported less communal goals towards the victim 
(1 = 0.93, 45 = 1.36)	than perpetrators (1 = 1.57, 45 = 1.06, :(572) = 	5.06, , <	.001, ; = 	 .52). The comparison of victims’ and bystanders’ communal goals towards the 
perpetrator was non-significant (1 = 0.12, 45 = 1.50, for victims; 1 = 0.20, 45 = 1.30, for 
bystanders; :(572) = 	0.6, , = 	 .551, ; = 	 .05).  
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In order to understand what could explain the impact of outcome on moral judgment 
and interpersonal goals, we explored the perceived probability of a harmful outcome and 
negligence judgments as mediators, relying on correlations of difference scores as the 
recommended approach for mediation in within-subjects designs (Judd, Kenny, & 
McClelland, 2001). As can be seen in Table 4, outcome effects on moral judgments generally 
correlated with outcome effects on perceived probability of harm and negligence ascriptions. 
The results were similar across social roles, except for the bystander interacting with victim 
condition, whose construct validity is, as discussed above, uncertain. Overall, our results are 
consistent with Kneer and Machery (2019), who hypothesize that the outcome effects on 
moral judgment might be driven by differences in perceived probability and negligence across 
outcomes. Given that the probability of the harmful outcome should be assessed ex ante and 
not ex post, the outcome effects on moral judgment might ultimately be a consequence of the 
hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1975).  
Evidence for a correlation between perceived likelihood of a negative outcome as well 
as negligence with punishment judgments, are weak, which is plausible due to the high 
sensitivity of punishment judgment to outcome information. Finally, the low and non-
significant correlations with agency and communion indicate that these variables cannot be 
considered potential mediators of the outcome effects on agency and communion.
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Table 4 
Correlations of Outcome Effects on Moral Judgment, Punishment, Agency, and Communion with Outcome Effects on Probability and Negligence 
Judgments 
 Moral Judgment  Punishment  Agency  Communion 
 Probability Negligence  Probability Negligence  Probability Negligence  Probability Negligence 
Perpetrator 0.17* 0.38***  0.06 0.08  -0.05  0.15   0.07  0.05 
Bystander_V 0.08 0.38***  0.08 0.35***  -0.05  0.22**  -0.01 -0.17* 
Bystander_P 0.23** 0.30***  0.16* 0.09   0.05 -0.05  -0.15 -0.01 
Victim 0.23** 0.35***  0.06 0.28***   0.02 -0.02  -0.06  0.04 
Note. Coefficients show the correlations of the relative difference (bad – neutral) of moral judgment, agency and communion respectively with the 
relative difference probability and negligence judgments (Study 3). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Discussion 
The findings of Study 3 are consistent with those of Study 2, in that the outcome effect 
on moral judgment and punishment judgments was equally strong across social roles. 
Corroborating the results of Studies 1 and 2, social role moderated the outcome effect on 
interpersonal goals: Victims exhibited stronger outcome effects on agency and communion 
than perpetrators. Furthermore, consistent with our reasoning, the outcome effect among 
victims was reliably stronger than the outcome effect among bystanders interacting with 
perpetrators. Results for the condition of bystanders interacting with the victim were not as 
expected. First, outcome effects were not stronger than in the perpetrator condition. Second, 
bystanders interacting with victims pursued less communion following the bad outcome than 
following the neutral outcome.  
 One explanation for these unexpected results might reside in the subtlety of the 
instructions. We first asked participants to morally judge the perpetrator’s behavior (e.g. 
“How wrong was it for Beth to leave Mary’s son alone in the above scenario”). In a second 
step, we asked participants to indicate their interpersonal goals towards the victim (e.g. 
“When I interact with Mary, it is important to me that I am friendly”). Note that the only cue 
for participants to understand that they should imagine an interaction with the victim was the 
name of the mother (“Mary”). It is possible that some participants overlooked this 
information, and instead imagined further interactions with the perpetrator (as they also had to 
assess the behavior of the perpetrator in moral regards just beforehand). This might have 
compromised the construct validity of this condition. 
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Robustness Checks Using Bayesian Regression Modeling 
 We ran supplementary Bayesian analyses on moral judgments as it is unclear to what 
extent our measures of moral judgments have the interval scale properties required for an 
ANOVA. In some cases, treating ordinal data as metric data can result in serious 
underestimation or overestimation of effects (cf. Liddell & Kruschke, 2018). Bayesian 
modeling allows for specifying a potentially more appropriate distribution of the outcome 
variable.  
Using the R-Package brms (Bürkner, 2017), we fitted Bayesian Generalized 
Multilevel Models by regressing each moral judgment item (permissibility, wrongness, 
blame, and punishment) separately on social role and outcome, using a cumulative link 
function, non-informative priors, and random intercepts for participants. Across the three 
studies, results were almost always in accordance with ANOVA models, such that negative 
outcomes were judged more harshly than neutral outcomes: the Highest Density Intervals 
(HDI) did not include 0 (for full report of results see online appendix). With regard to the 
interaction between outcome and social role, in line with ANOVA models in Studies 2 and 3, 
these analyses generally (in 31 out of 36 analyses) confirmed the absence of evidence for a 
moderating effect of social role. Interestingly, Bayesian regression analyses revealed this 
absence of evidence for moderation also for Study 1, where the ANOVA yielded a significant 
interaction (see online appendix for results of separate analyses of moral judgment items). 
Treating moral judgments as ordinal data, as the Bayesian Generalized Multilevel Model 
allowed us to do, is statistically more sound than the preregistered metric ANOVAs we 
reported above for simplicity of presentation. Thus, these results help to resolve the 
inconsistent results for the social role x outcome interactions across studies by increasing our 
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confidence in the overall conclusion that peoples’ divergent moral judgments following bad 
and neutral outcome are not moderated by social role. 
Are Judgments and Goals Related? 
Across three studies, the broad picture of results showed that the social role people 
assumed during a hypothetical transgression moderated outcome effects on interpersonal 
goals, but not the outcome effects on moral judgments. These divergent findings cast doubt on 
our theoretical assumption that the harshness of moral judgments would determine the 
intensity of subsequent role-specific interpersonal goals. Given that both moral judgments and 
interpersonal goals were only measured and not manipulated, it is impossible to decide 
whether moral judgments are causally prior to interpersonal goals or whether the reverse is 
true. Both causal models imply that the outcome effects (i.e., difference scores of bad 
outcome minus neutral outcome) on moral judgments and interpersonal goals are correlated 
(Judd, et al., 2001). Nevertheless, for an indirect test of within-subject mediation, we 
performed correlation analyses after combining the data from all three studies for greater 
sensitivity (for separate analyses of the three studies see online appendix). As depicted on the 
left-hand side of Table 5, the correlations of the outcome effects on judgments and goals were 
by and large small and not significantly different from zero, yielding no evidence for 
mediation or reverse mediation. Outcome effects on punishment and goals, however, were 
correlated for victims and bystanders (see right-hand side of Table 5), such that outcome-
dependent changes in the willingness to punish the perpetrator were accompanied by changes 
in agentic and communal goals.  
Looking at neutral and bad outcomes separately (see Table 6), however, revealed 
larger correlations between participants’ moral judgments and interpersonal goals. The results 
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suggest that people’s moral judgments positively relate to their role specific goals, across both 
outcomes: Perpetrators’ moral judgments correlated positively with their communal goals. 
The more harshly they judged their own actions, the stronger the communal goals they 
wanted to pursue. By contrast, victims’ and bystanders’ moral judgment and calls for 
punishment were by and large positively associated with their agentic goals and negatively 
with their communal goals, such that the more harshly they judged a transgression, the more 
agentically and uncommunally they wanted to act.  
Overall, then, these results suggest that (pre-existing) individual differences in moral 
judgment are systematically related to interpersonal goals, but that the moral judgment 
differences produced by the manipulation of outcome severity are unrelated to differences in 
interpersonal goals between neutral and bad outcomes.  
Table 5 
Correlations of Outcome Effects on Moral Judgment and Punishment, With Outcome Effects 
on Agency, and Communion aggregated across Studies 1 - 3 
Variable Correlation of Outcome Effects on 
Moral Judgment and 
 Correlation of Outcome Effects on 
Punishment and 
 Outcome Effects 
on Agency        
Outcome Effects 
on Communion 
 Outcome Effects 
on Agency        
Outcome Effects 
on Communion  
Victim    0.1  -0.09  0.3*** -0.5*** 
Bystander   -0.07  -0.15*  0.15* -0.19** 
Perpetrator   -0.03   0.02  -0.04 0.05 
Note. n = 233 in the perpetrator condition, n = 230 in the victim condition, n = 200 in the 
bystander condition (from Study 3, only the bystander interacting with perpetrator condition 
is reported), * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 6 
Correlations of Moral Judgment and Punishment with Agency and Communion aggregated across Studies 1 - 3 
 Correlation of Moral 
Judgment and Agency 
 Correlation of Moral Judgment 
and Communion 
 Correlations of Punishment and 
Agency 
 Correlations of Punishment and 
Communion 
 Neutral 
Outcome 
Bad 
Outcome 
 Neutral 
Outcome 
Bad 
Outcome 
 Neutral 
Outcome 
Bad 
Outcome 
 Neutral 
Outcome 
Bad Outcome 
Victim   0.3***   0.41***  –0.16* –0.49***  0.19** 0.42***  -0.34*** -0.58*** 
Bystander   0.29***   0.3***  –0.12 –0.18*  0.32*** 0.3***  -0.24*** -0.24*** 
Perpetrator   0.02 –0.05    0.18**   0.17**  -0.01 -0.01  -0.08 0.05 
Note. n = 233 in the perpetrator condition, n = 230 in the victim condition, n = 200 in the bystander condition (from Study 3, only the bystander 
interacting with perpetrator condition is reported), * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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General Discussion 
The present research investigated whether people’s social roles influence their moral 
judgments and interpersonal goals following transgressions with negative vs. neutral 
outcomes. We replicated the outcome effect on moral judgment among bystanders of a moral 
transgression (e.g. Cushman, 2008; Cushman et al., 2009; Gino et al., 2009; Lench et al., 
2015; Young et al., 2010) and extended it to victims and perpetrators. Three studies yielded 
evidence that, on average, transgressions were judged more harshly when the scenario 
described a chain of events originating from the actor that due to bad luck results in harm 
rather than no harm to the victim. Contrary to predictions, these outcome effects were not 
moderated by social role. Victims and perpetrators agreed with bystanders in judging harmful 
transgressions more harshly than harmless transgressions. The perceived probability that the 
action would produce negative outcomes mediated outcome effects on moral judgment, and 
this indicates bias. However, we also confirmed previous reports of large proportions of 
participants making identical moral judgments for neutral and bad outcomes (41 %, across 
Studies 1 – 3; Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012; Kneer & Machery, 2019).7 Viewed in 
 
7 According to the results of Kneer & Machery (2019), in within-subjects designs and contrastive 
designs, the vast majority of participants ascribe the same measure of wrongness, permissibility and blame to the 
lucky and the unlucky agents. The philosophical “puzzle of moral luck”, they suggest, might thus be 
misconceived, since robust outcome effects can only be obtained in between-subjects designs (given that the 
puzzle draws on a comparative evaluation of the agents). In our experiments the proportion of participants who 
judge the agents identically across outcomes is considerable, though less pronounced. Importantly, however, this 
might be a consequence of the design choice: Rather than reading both scenarios first and reporting their 
judgments, participants read one scenario, judged the agent, filled in a lengthy questionnaire concerning 
The Outcome Effect Among Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders 
 
 
 
52 
conjunction with small and inconsistent main effects of social role on moral judgment, these 
results suggest that (a) the Puzzle of Moral Luck may be confined to a barely over 50 % of 
participants (cf. Kneer & Machery, 2019), and (b) people in different social roles agree in 
their average increase in harshness following bad outcomes. This is good news for 
philosophers (a) and laypeople (b) alike. 
 Importantly, however, victims and perpetrators differed in their outcome effects with 
regard to interpersonal goals. These differences were strong and consistent across studies. The 
first difference is the nature of their responses. Consistent with the needs-based model 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), victims had more agentic and more uncommunal goals when 
transgressions resulted in harm rather than no harm, whereas perpetrators had more 
communal and unagentic goals. The second difference is the magnitude of the outcome effect. 
Consistent with the prediction, derived from introspection illusion (Pronin, 2009), that victims 
would weight outcome information more heavily than perpetrators, the outcome effects on 
role-specific goals were stronger among victims than among perpetrators. Although not in 
every case significant, bystanders were less sensitive to outcome severity than victims, and 
more sensitive than perpetrators. 
As might be expected based on the pattern of results reported above, the relationship 
between outcome effects on moral judgment and outcome effects on interpersonal goals was 
not straightforward. Within-subjects mediation analyses suggested that the outcome effects on 
moral judgment and interpersonal goals were for the most part unrelated. In other words, 
contrary to our initial assumption, the extent to which victims and perpetrators adjust the level 
 
interpersonal goals, and were then presented with the second scenario. The contrastive aspect of the within-
subjects design was thus considerably reduced. 
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of harshness of their moral judgment to the severity of the outcome does not predict the extent 
to which they adjust their goals for interacting with each other. The only exception was the 
relationship between victims’ and bystanders’ increased calls for punishment and higher 
agency as well as lower communion following bad outcomes. 
As will be recalled, we followed Cushman (2008) by using four distinct moral 
dependent variables: permissibility, wrongness, blame and deserved punishment. Cushman’s 
influential Dual Process Model separates moral judgment into two kinds. They differ in their 
relative weighting of information pertaining to the agent’s mental states on the one hand and 
the causal factors (including outcome) on the other. On Cushman’s view, permissibility and 
wrongness judgments (Type1) are predominantly – though not exclusively – influenced by 
mental factors, whereas Type2 judgments of blame and deserved punishment are strongly 
sensitive to causal factors such as severity of outcome. However, recent studies suggest that 
blame patterns with permissibility and wrongness rather than with deserved punishment, in so 
far as the latter is considerably more sensitive to causal factors than the other three types of 
moral judgment (for a discussion, see Kneer & Machery, 2019). In our experiments, too, we 
found the effect sizes of outcome on blame to be very similar to those for outcome on 
permissibility and wrongness. In Experiments 2 and 3, for instance, they ranged between 
hp2=.23 and .31 for permissibility, wrongness and blame. The effect sizes of outcome on 
punishment, by contrast, were about twice as pronounced (hp2=.66 and .69 in Experiments 2 
and 3 respectively, see online appendix for detailed results).       
While these results constitute further evidence in favor of the existence of two distinct 
types of moral judgment postulated by Cushman’s Dual Process Model, they offer little in the 
way of explaining the overall mismatch between moral judgment and action disposition, 
The Outcome Effect Among Perpetrators, Victims, and Bystanders 
 
 
 
54 
which we will label the judgment-action mismatch, or JAM for short. In the following, we 
would like to explore a number of possible interpretations of this result.  
Experimental Shortcomings 
As is well documented (Feltz et al., 2012; Kneer, 2018), it is difficult to make 
participants slip into the proverbial shoes of a distinct target individual so as to judge from 
their perspective in text-based experiments. Whereas a short set of four, somewhat abstract, 
questions concerning moral evaluation might not suffice to trigger role-specific judgment 
patterns and corresponding introspection illusion effects, things might be different as regards 
our measure of action dispositions. In the latter, the interactive element (“When I interact with 
X, it is important to me that […]”, and hence the participant’s particular role, are potentially 
more salient. Furthermore, the questionnaire’s 32 questions circle through many possible 
behavioral patterns, thus exploring nuanced features of the imaginary situation. Assuming the 
perspective (and hence social role) of the target individual might have thus been easier for the 
part of the experiment that explores interpersonal goals. In short, according to our first, and 
perhaps least exciting, candidate explanation of the JAM we were only partially successful in 
activating perspective-taking among participants. Whereas participants did manifest the 
expected social role effects as measured by the CSIG rich in situational detail, the short text 
vignettes paired with the moral judgment questions might have failed to trigger the kinds of 
phenomena familiar from Pronin’s research. Although this possibility cannot be dismissed 
completely, it is important to point out that all participants included in our analyses did 
answer the comprehension check regarding social role correctly. 
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Cognitivism 
Prima facie, the statistical independence of changes in moral judgment and changes in 
interpersonal goals seems to spell trouble for cognitivism, according to which moral action is 
driven by moral judgment. But perhaps the situation is less bleak. From the point of view of 
cognitivism, it is a welcome finding that moral judgment is insensitive to social role: whether 
or not an action is wrong, and whether or not an agent is blameworthy, does not depend on 
whether the judging party finds themselves in the role of victim, perpetrator or bystander. All 
it thus takes is an explanation for the decoupling of the outcome sensitivity with regard to 
judgments and action dispositions. In fact, the moral luck literature provides a promising 
candidate for just such an explanation: agent-regret. 
In his original discussion of moral luck, Williams (1981) argues that in cases where an 
agent is the causal origin of a bad consequence yet entirely free from moral blame, they will 
feel a type of regret that differs from both ordinary regret on the one hand and (morally 
inflected) remorse or guilt on the other. What is distinctive of this kind of situation is that, in 
contrast to a mere bystander, the agent “might have acted otherwise, and the focus of the 
regret is on that possibility, the thought being informed [in part by first-personal conceptions 
of how one might have acted otherwise]” (Williams, 1981, p. 27). 
Agent-regret, Williams emphasizes, is not confined to the mental level but engenders 
distinctive behavioral dispositions: those who blamelessly harm another tend to be disposed to 
make amends. What is more, rather than being morally obliged, they have – as philosophers 
would say – special normative powers to take responsibility for the outcome, much like 
parents do for their children (Enoch, 2012). The kind of responsibility the blameless agents 
can decide and might be expected to shoulder, Enoch suggests, parallels the kind of 
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responsibility we assume in making a promise: Neither arises from a moral debt towards 
others, but is generated by a voluntary commitment.  
If the specific social role (agent v. bystander) leaves a morality-independent normative 
footprint, then it will not stop short of the victim: The victim can reasonably expect the agent 
to manifest agent-regret, to take responsibility for the outcome and to provide restitution of 
some sort.  
While Williams’ and Enoch’s reflections predict distinctive, role-specific personal 
goals, these are engendered directly by the causal structure, and are independent of the moral 
considerations invoked by the needs-based model. Agent-regret would thus provide precisely 
the kind of explanation needed in defense of (the possibility of) cognitivism: Moral judgments 
are not, and should not, be role-dependent. Action dispositions, rather than being a direct 
consequence of an assessment of the moral debt that the perpetrator owes to the victim 
(Shnabel & Nadler, 2015), might result from normative expectations regarding the voluntary 
commitment the perpetrator should make to redress the harm. As for victims (and bystanders), 
we obtained some evidence of a relationship between outcome effects and action dispositions, 
but this was confined to punishment judgments. What this suggests, then, is that the 
normative expectations regarding appropriate action of which agent regret is a symptom do 
not only bear on the agent of a transgression, but also to victims and bystanders (taking the 
perspective of the victim). Considering that we have introduced the post hoc explanation of 
normative expectations in the context of agent regret, one might think, that they apply first 
and foremost to agents, i.e., perpetrators. This might seem at odds with the fact that we 
observed the largest outcome effects not among perpetrators, but among victims. However, it 
is important to note that normative expectations drive the quality of the behavior (i.e., instead 
of the moral judgments), but not the extent to which outcome information is utilized. As we 
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predicted and found, victims pay more attention to outcome information when setting their 
interpersonal goals than bystanders or perpetrators.  
Implications for Reconciliation Processes 
Our results regarding the JAM have interesting implications for how the differential 
needs of perpetrators and victims arise according to the needs-based model. Building on the 
assumption that moral debt is the engine that motivates interpersonal behavior, manipulation 
checks used in previous research typically assessed the extent to which perpetrators 
acknowledged their offenses (e.g., Shnabel & Nadler, 2008) or privileged groups conceded 
that their privileges are illegitimate (e.g., Aydin et al., 2019). Possibly, however, the 
predictions of the needs-based model would also hold when agents accidentally and thus 
blamelessly harm others, in which case they cannot be considered perpetrators. This is an 
intriguing possibility which deserves further study.  
Apologies are more likely to be accepted and lead to forgiveness if they are matched 
in length and content to the severity of the transgression (Bennet & Earwaker, 1994; 
Kirchhoff, Wagner, & Strack, 2012). However, the lack of connection between moral 
judgment and action dispositions cause concern about such a fit: Parties adapt their action 
dispositions in response to outcome severity differently. No matter whether actions resulted in 
harm or not, perpetrators always increased their communal behavior towards the victim, 
whereas victims only increased their agentic behavior towards the perpetrator when actions 
resulted in harm. Thus, our findings that victims’ interpersonal goals are much more 
contingent on outcome severity than perpetrators’ goals suggest a potential miscalibration 
between the type of apology expected by the victim and the one the perpetrator is offering. 
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Conclusion 
In the present research, we observed that when victims and perpetrators reflect on a 
transgression, they tend to agree with each other (and with bystanders) as to their judgments 
of the permissibility and wrongness of the action, their (self-)blame, and the degree of 
punishment they call for. For some participants, these moral judgments were unaffected by 
the severity of the outcome, and for others, judgments were harsher when outcomes were 
more severe, driving the overall outcome effects that we observed. Although the unanimity of 
outcome effects across social roles regarding moral judgment is reassuring, our results 
suggest that it ends when it comes to action dispositions. Largely independent of moral 
judgment, victims and perpetrators were differentially sensitive to outcome information when 
they reported their interpersonal goals regarding agentic and communal action toward each 
other. Our discussion points to the fascinating possibility that moral action could be explained 
by role-specific non-moral normative demands familiar from the philosophical literature on 
agent-regret (Williams, 1981, Enoch, 2012) paired with selective information-processing 
predicted by the introspection illusion (Pronin, 2009). 
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